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political	 economy	 trade-offs	 of	 the	 seven	 distinct	 mechanisms	 for	 achieving	
sovereign	 debt	 sustainability.	 Two	 mechanisms	 for	 achieving	 sustainability	 –		
financial	 aid	 and	 asset	 exchange	 –	 are	 often	 underemphasized	 or	 entirely	
overlooked	by	economists	even	though	they	frequently	play	an	 important	role	 in	
sustaining	public	debts.	These	two	mechanisms	may	receive	less	attention	due	to	
prior	 emphasis	 on	 sovereign	 debt	 reduction,	 or	 how	 to	 pay-down	 or	 pay-off	
nominal	 public	 debts,	 over	 sovereign	 debt	 sustainability,	 which	 is	 defined	 as	
maintaining	 any	 given	 level	 of	 public	 debt	 without	 triggering	 a	 sovereign	 debt	
crisis.	 Examples	 of	 each	 of	 the	 different	 mechanisms	 for	 achieving	 debt	
sustainability	and	their	respective	policy	trade-offs	are	discussed.	In	the	absence	of	
sufficient	economic	growth,	which	 is	 the	near	universally	preferred	 solution	 to	a	
debt	problem,	or	financial	aid,	which	typically	requires	international	coordination,	




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Abstract:	 Economists	 and	 credit	 rating	 agencies	 employ	 different	 definitions	 of	
sovereign	default.	This	paper	explores	the	challenges	around	classifying	sovereign	
credit	 events	 through	 an	 examination	 of	 the	 UK,	 which	 in	 1946	 recorded	 the	
highest	 public	 debt-to-GDP	 ratio	 in	 the	 20th	 century.	 Britain	 ‘partially	 defaulted’	
multiple	 times	 in	 the	 decades	 following	 the	 Second	 World	 War.	 However,	 the	
conventional	historical	view	is	that	the	UK	avoided	a	sovereign	default,	along	with	


































		 		 Stock		 Sovereign	 		 Yearly	
	
Currency	 Inflation	 market	 debt	crises	 Banking		 crisis	
	
crises	 crises	 crash	 domestic	 external	 crises	 tally	
1941	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	
1942	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	
1943	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	
1944	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	
1945	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	
1946	 1	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 1	
1947	 1	 0	 1	 0	 0	 0	 2	
1948	 0	 0	 1	 0	 0	 0	 1	
1949	 1	 0	 1	 0	 0	 0	 2	
1950	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	
1951	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	
1952	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	
1953	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	
1954	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	
1955	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	
1956	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	
1957	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	
1958	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	
1959	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	
1960	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	
1961	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	
1962	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	
1963	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	
1964	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	
1965	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	











































































































































































































































































































































	 	 Official	 Other	 Total	 %	Total	
Overseas	Sterling	Area	 	 	 	 	
	 Australia,	New	Zealand	 £265	 £40	 £305	 8.5%	
	 and	South	Africa	 	 	 	 0.0%	
	 India,	Pakistan	and	Ceylon	 1,313	 45	 1,358	 37.7%	
	 Middle	East*	 443	 147	 590	 16.4%	
	
East,	West	and	Central	
Africa	 128	 77	 205	 5.7%	
	 Other	 213	 264	 477	 13.3%	
	 Subtotal	 £2,362	 £573	 £2,935	 81.6%	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Non-Sterling	Area	 	 	 	 	
	 Western	Europe	 £183	 £152	 £335	 9.3%	
	 Latin	America	 159	 7	 166	 4.6%	
	 North	America	 14	 19	 33	 0.9%	
	 Other	 44	 86	 130	 3.6%	
	 Subtotal	 £400	 £264	 £664	 18.4%	
	 	 	 	 	 	


























Floating	Debt	 23%	 13%	 29%	
Dated	Stocks	 68%	 35%	 37%	
Funded	Debt	 5%	 46%	 16%	



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Date	 Value*	 Value	 Reserves	 Previous	Date	
31	August,	1938	 $4,190	 $4,190	 100%	 	
	 	 	 	 	
31	December,	1946	 $2,696	 $1,409	 34%	 -$1,494	
	 	 	 	 	
31	March,	1947	 $2,380	 $1,259	 30%	 -$316	
30	June,	1947	 $2,410	 $1,223	 29%	 $30	
30	September,	1947	 $2,383	 $1,192	 28%	 -$27	





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































of	 the	 historical	 literature	 and	 archival	 evidence	 show	 that	 financial	 repression	
played	an	important	role	in	sustaining	Britain's	record-setting	levels	of	public	debt.	
In	Britain,	eleven	pieces	of	 legislation	and	sixteen	polices/directives	are	identified	
that	 supported	 financial	 repression	 during	 this	 period.	 An	 examination	 of	 two	
leading	 quantitative	 methods	 for	 measuring	 financial	 repression	 highlights	 the	
need	 for	 alternative	 approaches,	 such	 as	 a	 proposed	 composite	 indicator.	 Using	











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Treasury	Bond	Issuance	 1950	 1951	 1952	 1953	 1954	
Bond(1)	principal	 £100	 	 	 	 	
Coupon	payment	(fixed)	 £2.50	 £2.50	 £2.50	 	 	
Coupon	yield	(fixed)	 2.50%	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Market	price	of	Bond(1)	 £100	 £100	 £75.00	 	 	
Current	Yield	 2.50%	 2.50%	 3.33%	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Bond(2)	-	principal	 	 	 	 £100	 	
Coupon	payment	(fixed)	 	 	 	 £3.33	 £3.33	
Coupon	yield	(fixed)	 	 	 	 3.33%	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Market	price	of	Bond(2)	 	 	 	 £100	 £100	
Current	Yield	 	 	 	 3.33%	 3.33%	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Treasury	Balance	Sheet	 1950	 1951	 1952	 1953	 1954	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Beginning	of	Year	Cash	 £0.00	 £100.00	 £97.50	 £10.00	 £10.00	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Annual	Surplus	/	Deficit	 £0.00	 £0.00	 -£10.00	 -£100.00	 £0.00	
Interest	expense	 £0.00	 £2.50	 £2.50	 	 £3.33	
Debt	Issued	-	Deficit	-	Interest	=	Cash	 £100.00	 £97.50	 £85.00	 £10.00	 £6.67	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Bond	Repurchases	 	 	 £75.00	 £0.00	 £0.00	
Gain	(Loss)	on	Bond	Repurchase	(one	time)	 	 	 £25.00	 	 	
Gain	(Loss)	on	interest	refinancing	(reoccurring)	 	 	 	 	 -£0.83	
	 	 	 	 	 	












































	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Yield	Range	of	All	Issues	30-years	or	
Longer	
		 Annual		 		 		 Max	Current	Yield	
of	Premium	Issues	Year	 Avg.	 Yield	%	 High	 Yield	 	Low	 	Yield	 Low	 High	
1935	 86.500	 2.89%	 94.3750	 2.65%	 80.000	 3.13%	 2.88%	 3.13%	 3.48%	
1936	 85.000	 2.94%	 87.2400	 2.87%	 82.250	 3.04%	 2.96%	 3.17%	 3.54%	
1937	 76.250	 2.28%	 84.8125	 2.95%	 73.125	 3.42%	 3.37%	 3.43%	 3.64%	
1938	 74.000	 3.38%	 79.3750	 3.16%	 64.000	 3.91%	 3.56%	 3.62%	 3.87%	
1939	 67.250	 3.72%	 71.1250	 3.51%	 61.000	 4.10%	 3.65%	 3.77%	 3.62%	
1940	 73.500	 3.40%	 77.0000	 3.25%	 68.125	 3.67%	 3.25%	 3.44%	 3.58%	
1941	 79.875	 3.13%	 82.8750	 3.02%	 76.750	 3.26%	 3.03%	 3.19%	 3.62%	
1942	 82.500	 3.03%	 83.6250	 2.99%	 81.000	 3.09%	 3.03%	 3.18%	 3.62%	
1943	 80.625	 3.10%	 83.2500	 3.00%	 78.250	 3.19%	 3.14%	 3.23%	 3.62%	
1944	 79.625	 3.14%	 82.2500	 3.04%	 78.688	 3.18%	 3.07%	 3.18%	 3.62%	
1945	 85.625	 2.92%	 92.8125	 2.69%	 91.563	 3.06%	 2.74%	 2.91%	 3.44%	
1946	 96.188	 2.60%	 99.6250	 2.51%	 81.125	 3.08%	 2.53%	 2.67%	 3.69%	
1947	 90.500	 2.76%	 99.1250	 2.52%	 80.000	 3.12%	 3.00%	 3.05%	 3.65%	
1948	 77.875	 3.21%	 83.3750	 3.01%	 74.500	 3.36%	 3.13%	 3.19%	 3.94%	
1949	 75.750	 3.30%	 81.9375	 3.05%	 65.128	 3.84%	 3.56%	 3.81%	 3.90%	
1950	 70.375	 3.55%	 74.6875	 3.35%	 68.125	 3.67%	 3.53%	 3.73%	 		
1951	 66.000	 3.79%	 71.5000	 3.50%	 60.125	 4.16%	 4.06%	 4.44%	 		
1952	 59.125	 4.23%	 62.0000	 4.03%	 55.000	 4.55%	 4.27%	 4.61%	 		
1953	 61.240	 4.08%	 65.2500	 3.83%	 58.375	 4.28%	 3.89%	 4.27%	 		
1954	 66.500	 3.76%	 69.7500	 3.58%	 58.375	 4.28%	 3.81%	 4.15%	 		
1955	 60.000	 4.17%	 66.5000	 3.76%	 54.875	 4.56%	 4.39%	 4.50%	 		
1956	 52.750	 4.74%	 56.7500	 4.41%	 49.875	 5.01%	 4.90%	 5.08%	 		
1957	 50.250	 4.98%	 55.6875	 4.49%	 45.000	 5.56%	 5.41%	 5.62%	 		
1958	 50.250	 4.98%	 52.8125	 4.73%	 46.750	 5.35%	 4.89%	 5.20%	 		
1959	 51.875	 4.82%	 53.6250	 4.66%	 48.625	 5.14%	 4.99%	 5.40%	 		
1960	 46.375	 5.40%	 49.7500	 5.02%	 43.875	 5.71%	 5.68%	 6.07%	 		
1961	 40.375	 6.20%	 44.0000	 5.70%	 36.250	 6.90%	 6.45%	 6.85%	 		
	
		 		








































1946	 23.64	 7.00%	 2.60%	 1.04	 10.9%	
1947	 25.63	 7.00%	 2.76%	 1.09	 10.1%	
1948	 25.62	 7.00%	 3.21%	 0.97	 8.1%	
1949	 25.17	 7.00%	 3.30%	 0.93	 7.3%	
1950	 25.80	 7.00%	 3.55%	 0.89	 6.7%	
1951	 25.92	 7.00%	 3.79%	 0.83	 5.6%	
1952	 25.89	 7.00%	 4.23%	 0.72	 4.5%	
1953	 26.05	 7.00%	 4.08%	 0.76	 4.4%	
1954	 26.58	 7.00%	 3.76%	 0.86	 4.8%	
1955	 26.93	 7.00%	 4.17%	 0.76	 3.9%	
1956	 27.04	 7.00%	 4.74%	 0.61	 2.9%	
1957	 27.01	 7.00%	 4.98%	 0.55	 2.5%	
1958	 27.23	 7.00%	 4.98%	 0.55	 2.4%	
1959	 27.38	 7.00%	 4.82%	 0.60	 2.5%	






































1946	 23.64	 5.50%	 2.60%	 0.69	 7.2%	
1947	 25.63	 5.86%	 2.76%	 0.79	 7.4%	
1948	 25.62	 7.00%	 3.21%	 0.97	 8.1%	
1949	 25.17	 7.20%	 3.30%	 0.98	 7.7%	
1950	 25.80	 7.74%	 3.55%	 1.08	 8.1%	
1951	 25.92	 8.26%	 3.79%	 1.16	 7.8%	
1952	 25.89	 9.22%	 4.23%	 1.29	 8.1%	
1953	 26.05	 8.90%	 4.08%	 1.25	 7.3%	
1954	 26.58	 8.20%	 3.76%	 1.18	 6.5%	
1955	 26.93	 9.09%	 4.17%	 1.33	 6.8%	
1956	 27.04	 10.34%	 4.74%	 1.51	 7.2%	
1957	 27.01	 10.86%	 4.98%	 1.59	 7.2%	
1958	 27.23	 10.86%	 4.98%	 1.60	 6.9%	
1959	 27.38	 10.51%	 4.82%	 1.56	 6.4%	




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Export	Lending	 1964	 post-Second	World	War	 Bank	of	England	established	loan	priorities	
which	gave	preference	to	exports	and	
discouraged	speculation298	




























































































































































































































































































































































































































1950	Avg.	 2.03%	 2.99%	 3.77%	 4.07%	 5.48%	
1951	YTD	Avg.	 1.84	 3.59	 3.98	 4.28	 5.35	
Oct.	1951	 1.70	 3.66	 4.06	 4.33	 5.26	
Nov.		 1.97	 3.78	 4.18	 4.50	 5.76	
Dec.		 2.29	 4.08	 4.35	 4.70	 5.90	
Jan.	1952	 2.36	 4.14	 4.37	 4.71	 6.35	
Feb.	 2.41	 4.17	 4.42	 4.77	 6.43	
Mar.	 2.92	 4.31	 4.54	 4.92	 6.64	
April	 3.15	 4.24	 4.50	 4.84	 6.37	
May	 3.26	 4.27	 4.56	 4.85	 6.95	
June	 3.51	 4.45	 4.75	 4.94	 7.28	




3.01%	 4.29%	 4.56%	 4.86%	 6.69%	
%	Δ	Oct	1951		
to	July	1952	






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1941 1943 1945 1947 1949 1951 1953 1955 1957 1959














1945	 3.2%	 3.0%	 5.1%	 0.5%	 2.9%	 4.6%	
1946	 3.5%	 3.6%	 5.1%	 3.8%	 4.0%	 1.6%	
1947	 7.4%	 9.1%	 8.2%	 8.5%	 8.3%	 1.7%	
1948	 6.6%	 7.8%	 10.8%	 12.3%	 9.4%	 5.7%	
1949	 2.6%	 13.1%	 5.1%	 5.2%	 6.5%	 10.5%	
1950	 2.8%	 0.3%	 5.6%	 1.7%	 2.6%	 5.3%	
1951	 9.5%	 15.9%	 16.6%	 12.9%	 13.7%	 7.1%	
Annual	







































































































































































































































































































	 Variables	 Description	 Source	



















	 Deposit	interest	rate	(%)	 Interest	rate	paid	on	bank	deposits	 World	
Bank	
	 Interest	rate	spread	(%)	 Lending	rate	minus	deposit	rate	 World	
Bank	



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Variety	 Dec.	 Jan.	 Feb.	 Mar.	 April	 May	 June	 July	 Aug.	
Handpayments	
London	
N/A	 £2.98	 £3.06	 £3.09	 £3.06	 £3.04	 £2.70	 £2.80	 £2.83	
Scheduled	
Territory	 £3.05	 £2.95	 £3.03	 £3.10	 £3.03	 £2.65	 £2.60	 £2.66	 £2.87	
Dutch	
Accounts	 £3.25	 £3.18	 £3.32	 £3.30	 £3.28	 £3.28	 £3.20	 £3.14	 £3.26	
Egyptian	
Accounts	 £3.30	 £3.25	 £3.10	 £3.15	 £3.18	 £3.20	 £3.00	 £2.85	 £2.90	
Italian	
Accounts	 £3.85	 £3.45	 £3.40	 £3.45	 £3.40	 £3.45	 £3.28	 £3.18	 £3.16	
French	



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Swiss Fr./British £ '39-'44 - '46-'50   '39-'44 '46-'50 
 
Observations (n) 2,933  1,486 1,447 
 
Max Rate Fr. 17.75  Fr. 17.75 Fr. 12.80 
 
Min Rate Fr. 5.10  Fr. 5.10 Fr. 8.75 
 
Mean Fr. 10.17  Fr. 9.59 Fr. 10.76 
 
Median Fr. 10.33  Fr. 8.68 Fr. 10.80 
 
Standard Deviation Fr. 2.36  Fr. 3.10 Fr. 0.85 
     
U.S. $/British £*         
 
Observations (n) 2932  1486 1446 
 
Max Rate $3.85   $3.85  $3.22  
 
Min Rate $1.42   $1.42  $2.30  
 
Mean $2.69   $2.67  $2.72  
 
Median $2.74   $2.77  $2.73  
 
SD Rate $0.48   $0.63  $0.23  
  
    
Correlation of Exchange Rates         
 
Fr./$ - Fr./£ 0.58  0.58 0.36 
 
Fr./$ - $/£ 0.10  -0.08 -0.54 
 































































































































































































































	Date	 Firm	Name mentions Firm	Type HQ Source Reference Comments
28/01/1949 Guaranty	Trust 1 Commercial	Bank New	York BOE EC5/1	No.	56 Guaranty's	London	offices	were	located	on	
Lombard	St.
04-Feb-49 Chase	National	Bank 1 Commercial	Bank New	York BOE EC5/1	No.	64
04-Feb-49 Schroders 1 Merchant	Bank London BOE EC5/1	No.	64 New	York	branch?
04-Feb-49 Guaranty	Trust 2 Commercial	Bank New	York BOE EC5/1	No.	64 Provided	the	BoE	with	NY	rates,	volume,	
other	firm	and	trend	info	on	12	Feb.	1949
07-May-49 Albert	de	Jong	&	Co. 1 Unknown New	York BOE EC5/2	No.	5a
Offices	located	at		37	Wall	St.	NY,	NY;	
quoting	$3.25/£	for	French	account	sterling.
17-Jun-49 Swiss	Bank 1 Universal	Bank? Switzerland BOE EC5/2	No.	23
The	New	York	branch	of	Swiss	Bank	named	
as	a	dealer	of	cheap	sterling.
17-Jun-49 Chase	National	Bank 2 Commercial	Bank New	York BOE EC5/2	No.	23
17-Jun-49 Guaranty	Trust 3 Commercial	Bank New	York BOE EC5/2	No.	23
19-Jul-49 Chase	National	Bank 3 Commercial	Bank New	York BOE EC5/2	No.	39
19-Jul-49 Guaranty	Trust 4 Commercial	Bank New	York BOE EC5/2	No.	39
19-Jul-49 National	City	Bank 1 Commercial	Bank New	York BOE EC5/2	No.	39
19-Jul-49 White 1 Wirehouse New	York BOE EC5/2	No.	39 One	of	the	larger	wirehouses
19-Jul-49 Weld 1 Wirehouse New	York BOE EC5/2	No.	39 One	of	the	larger	wirehouses
19-Jul-49 Hayden-Stone 1 Wirehouse New	York BOE EC5/2	No.	39 One	of	the	larger	wirehouses
19-Jul-49 Sutro 1 Wirehouse	 New	York BOE EC5/2	No.	39 One	of	the	larger	wirehouses
14-Nov-49 Hayden,	Stone	&	Co.
1
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Break	 2.5%	Confidence		 Breakpoint	date	 97.5%	Confidence		
1	 28-Mar-1940	 18-May-1940	 20-May-1940	
2	 10-Aug-1940	 20-Aug-1940	 24-Aug-1940	
3	 26-Dec-1940	 31-Dec-1940	 1-Mar-1941	
4	 10-Sep-1942	 30-Oct-1942	 3-Nov-1942	






























1	 18-May-1940	 15.0000	 14.4000	 -0.60	 -4.00	
2	 20-Aug-1940	 12.2500	 12.3000	 0.05	 0.41	
3	 31-Dec-1940	 8.2500	 8.1000	 0.15	 -1.82	
4	 30-Oct-1942	 7.3000	 7.2000	 0.10	 -1.37	


















































1	 18-May-1940	 23-May-1940	 5	
2	 20-Aug-1940	 2-Sep-1940	 13	
3	 31-Dec-1940	 30-Jan-1942	 395	
4	 30-Oct-1942	 5-Nov-1942	 6	



















































































































































































































































































































Break	 2.5%	Confidence		 Breakpoint	date	 97.5%	Confidence		
1	 01-Jul-47	 19-Aug-47	 28-Aug-47	
2	 10-Apr-48	 16-Apr-48	 28-May-48	
3	 14-Feb-49	 16-Mar-49	 04-Apr-49	






















































Month	 Market	 Official	 Discount	
March	 3.09	 4.03	 23.3%	
April	 3.06	 4.03	 24.1%	
May	 3.04	 4.03	 24.6%	
June	 2.70	 4.03	 33.0%	
July	 2.80	 4.03	 30.5%	
August	 2.83	 4.03	 29.8%	
Sept.	 2.55	 2.80	 8.9%	























































































































































































12-Sep-1949	 $4.030	 $2.8315	 29.7%	 Fr.	17.34	 Fr.	11.220	 35.3%	
13-Sep-1949	 4.030	 2.8586	 29.1%	 17.34	 11.320	 34.7%	
14-Sep-1949	 4.030	 2.8806	 28.5%	 17.34	 11.400	 34.3%	
15-Sep-1949	 4.030	 2.8851	 28.4%	 17.34	 11.425	 34.1%	
16-Sep-1949	 4.030	 2.8391	 29.6%	 17.34	 11.250	 35.1%	
17-Sep-1949	 4.030	 2.8391	 29.6%	 17.34	 11.250	 35.1%	
19-Sep	1949*	 2.800	 2.5990	 7.2%	 12.19	 10.500	 13.9%	
20-Sep-1949	 2.800	 2.7482	 1.9%	 12.19	 11.350	 6.9%	
21-Sep-1949	 2.800	 2.8000	 0.0%	 12.19	 11.900	 2.4%	
22-Sep-1949	 2.800	 2.8103	 -0.4%	 12.19	 12.000	 1.6%	
23-Sep-1949	 2.800	 2.8190	 -0.7%	 12.19	 12.150	 0.3%	
24-Sep-1949	 2.800	 2.8538	 -1.9%	 12.19	 12.300	 -0.9%	
26-Sep-1949	 2.800	 2.8719	 -2.6%	 12.19	 12.550	 -3.0%	
27-Sep-1949	 2.800	 2.8046	 -0.2%	 12.19	 12.200	 -0.1%	
28-Sep-1949	 2.800	 2.7578	 1.5%	 12.19	 11.900	 2.4%	
29-Sep-1949	 2.800	 2.7526	 1.7%	 12.19	 11.850	 2.8%	



































Month	 Market	 Official	 Discount	
April	 12.66	 17.34	 27.0%	
May	 12.25	 17.34	 29.4%	
June	 11.94	 17.34	 31.1%	
July	 11.46	 17.34	 33.9%	
Aug.	 11.13	 17.34	 35.8%	
Sept.	 11.50	 15.24*	 24.5%	





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































the	 challenges	 that	 alternative	 currencies	 have	 faced	 in	 gaining	 wider	 adoption.	
However,	the	most	commonly	observed	explanation	for	why	alternative	currencies	
decline	 is	 insufficient	 demand	 due	 to	 relatively	 high	 transaction	 costs,	 low	
institutional	support,	 inconsistent	social	motivation,	and	other	 factors.	Present-day	
alternative	 currencies,	 such	 as	 bitcoin	 and	 the	 Brixton	 pound,	 feature	 similarities	
and	 differences	 as	 compared	 to	 past	 alternative	 currencies.	Bitcoin	 in	 particular	
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Most	countries	today	have	national	currencies	(e.g.,	U.S.	dollar)	that	serve	as	
legal	tender.	National	currencies	are	the	most	common	form	of	legal	tender	and	are	
also	typically	the	dominant	currency,	meaning	they	face	very	little	if	any	competition	
from	other	currencies	within	the	borders	they	serve	as	legal	tender.	In	a	small	number	
of	cases	foreign	legal	tender	has	been	adopted	as	the	official	domestic	currency.	For	
example,	Montenegro	has	adopted	the	euro,	and	Ecuador	and	Panama	currently	use	
the	U.S.	dollar	as	their	official	currency.	Panama	started	using	the	U.S.	dollar	in	1904	
and	Ecuador	adopted	the	U.S.	dollar	in	2000,	and	both	are	part	of	a	group	of	ten	
countries	that	have	officially	adopted	the	U.S.	dollar.554	While	both	Panama	and	
Ecuador	have	adopted	U.S.	banknotes	as	the	exclusive	paper	currency,	both	countries	
mint	for	circulation	their	own	national	coins	for	use	alongside,	or	in	parallel,	to	U.S.	
coinage.555	A	parallel	currency	is	thus	any	legal	tender	currency	in	use	alongside	one	or	
more	other	currencies.	Historical	examples	of	parallel	currencies	include	the	many	gold	
and	silver	bimetallic	monetary	systems;	one	of	the	earliest	recorded	examples	of	a	
parallel	currency	system	took	place	when	copper	and	silver	circulated	alongside	one	
another	in	Ptolemaic	Egypt	in	220	B.C..556		
	
Looking	at	non-legal	tender	currencies,	a	black	market	currency	exists	when	a	
government	imposes	legal	restrictions	on	the	use	of	a	currency	but	is	unable	(or	
unwilling)	to	enforce	those	restrictions.	Another	example	of	a	black	market	currency	is	
when	the	government	is	unable	(or	unwilling)	to	enforce	an	official	exchange	rate	that	
differs	significantly	from	the	market	rate.	For	example,	due	to	the	persistent	inflation	
and	devaluation	of	the	Argentinian	peso,	the	U.S.	dollar	is	widely	used	today	by	
Argentinians	to	store	value,	transact	goods	and	services,	and	for	setting	prices.	In	
response	to	this	development	the	Argentinian	government	has	placed	legal	restrictions	
on	the	use	and	transfer	of	the	vast	quantity	of	U.S.	dollar	banknotes	in	Argentina.557	
However,	these	rules	have	not	prevented	U.S.	dollars	from	continuing	to	circulate	
																																																						
554	A	number	of	dependencies	also	use	the	U.S.	dollar	exclusively,	including	Bonaire,	British	Indian	Ocean	
Territory,	British	Virgin	Islands,	Saba,	Sint	Eustatius,	Turks	and	Caicos	Islands.	
555	Other	countries	that	circulate	their	own	national	coins	or	notes	alongside	the	U.S.	dollar	include	
Zimbabwe,	Micronesia,	and	Palau.	
556	(Reekmans,	1949)	
557	(Judson,	2012)	It	has	been	estimated	that	more	than	$50	billion	in	U.S.	dollar	banknotes	circulate	
inside	Argentina’s	borders.	See	also	http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-05-15/argentines-
hold-more-than-50-billion-in-u-dot-s-dot-currency-dot-heres-how-we-know	
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widely	in	Argentina.	The	U.S.	dollar,	which	is	legal	to	use	in	many	other	parts	of	the	
world,	can	therefore	be	considered	a	black	market	currency	in	Argentina.	A	historical	
example	of	a	black	market	currency	similar	to	Argentina’s	use	of	the	U.S.	dollar	was	the	
case	of	‘free’	British	sterling	banknotes	that	were	traded	in	London,	New	York,	Zurich,	
and	other	financial	centres	in	the	1940s	at	a	substantial	discount	to	the	official	
exchange	rate.	The	British	outlawed	and	actively	sought	to	tamp	down	the	exchange	of	
sterling	at	anything	other	than	the	official	rate	during	the	1940s.	However,	these	
efforts	were	largely	unsuccessful	until	sterling	was	officially	devalued	to	more	closely	
match	the	free	market	rate.558	
	
An	alternative	currency	is	any	instrument	that	serves	as	a	medium	of	exchange	
that	is	not	illegal,	or	minted	or	officially	designated	as	legal	tender	by	the	central	
government.	For	alternative	currencies	it	is	important	to	highlight	the	distinction	
drawn	here	between	legal	tender	minted	by	a	central	government	and	currency	
minted	or	sponsored	by	a	regional	or	other	local	government	(e.g.,	municipalities).	
Throughout	history	regional	and	local	governments	have	often	been	involved	with	the	
issuance	of	what	are	often	called	local	currencies.559	When	evaluating	whether	such	a	
local	currency	should	be	considered	an	alternative	currency	a	simple	definitional	test	
can	be	conducted:	can	the	local	currency	be	used	to	pay	for	goods	and	services	
throughout	the	country,	or	pay	taxes	levied	by	the	central	government?	Local	
government	sponsored	alternative	currencies	typically	cannot	be	used	beyond	the	
municipality’s	geographical	boundaries	or	to	pay	central	government	taxes,	and	they	
can	therefore	be	considered	as	an	alternative	currency.	
	
Not	everyone	uses	the	term	‘alternative	currency’	in	the	same	way	it	is	defined	
in	this	paper.	For	example,	Amato	et	al	(2003)	place	‘alternative’,	‘competing’,	‘local’,	
and	‘community’	currencies	all	under	the	heading	of	complementary	currency.560	
Practitioners	as	well	as	scholars	have	also	used	other	terms,	such	as	scrip.561	Recently	
regulators	and	other	officials	have	simultaneously	used	terms	such	as	digital	and	
																																																						
558	(Hileman,	2012)	
559	(Gatch,	2012)	
560	(Amato	et	al.,	2003,	p.	2)	Amato	et	al	incorrectly	reference	Hugh-Jones	(1950)	as	a	work	on	‘loyalty	
points’	as	a	private	currency	when	in	fact	Hugh-Jone’s	paper	is	on	government	points	used	for	rationing	
goods	during	the	1940s.		
561	See	for	example	(Harper,	1948,	p.	13)	
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virtual	to	describe	new	‘math-based’	currencies	or	‘cryptocurrencies’,	like	bitcoin.562	In	
summary,	there	is	a	lack	of	consensus	around	the	appropriate	terms	and	definitions	for	
alternative	currencies	
	
The	many	different	terms	employed	to	describe	the	various	instruments	
defined	in	this	paper	as	alternative	currencies	may	have	as	much	if	not	more	to	do	
with	the	marketing	of	such	instruments	than	any	effort	to	achieve	definitional	clarity.	
For	example,	terms	like	‘complimentary’	may	help	place	a	particular	currency	in	a	
more	favourable	light	with	both	users	and	regulators.	However,	the	myriad	of	
competing	terms	in	use	can	be	confusing,	or	even	inaccurate	in	some	instances.	For	
example,	the	‘complementary’	term	is	often	meant	to	connote	the	idea	that	a	
particular	currency	is	not	intended	as	a	substitute	for	national	currency,	and	this	
connotation	would	seem	appropriate	for	currencies	like	the	Brixton	pound	that	are	
fundamentally	linked	to	and	dependent	upon	British	sterling.563	However,	other	
alternative	currencies,	like	bitcoin,	are	not	necessarily	complimentary	or	similarly	
dependent	as	the	Brixton	pound	upon	a	national	currency.564	Other	problematic	
examples	include	the	use	of	the	term	‘digital’	to	distinguish	bitcoin	from	other	
currencies,	as	digital	can	also	apply	to	the	digital	form	of	national	currencies	like	the	
U.S.	dollar.	Further,	the	term	‘virtual’	may	be	better	reserved	for	currencies	like	the	
Linden	dollar	that	operate	in	virtual	reality	environments	than	applied	to	bitcoin,	
which	serves	as	a	medium	of	exchange	for	non-virtual	goods	and	services.	In	sum,	the	
term	‘alternative	currency’	is	is	suitably	general	to	encompass	instruments	such	as	
bitcoin	and	the	Brixton	pound,	whereas	terms	such	as	‘local’,	‘complimentary’,	and	
‘virtual’	are	useful	for	distinguishing	between	different	types	of	alternative	currencies.	
	
Several	currencies	are	difficult	to	classify	within	the	currency	framework	
presented	in	Table	40,	such	as	the	case	of	Cyprus	following	the	March	2013	imposition	
of	capital	controls.	Did	‘Cypriot	euros’,	which	had	legal	restrictions	limiting	their	
international	movement	and	exchange	into	other	currencies,	meet	the	parallel	
																																																						
562	The	Bank	of	England	refers	to	bitcoin	as	a		‘digital’	currency	(Ali	et	al.,	2014)	while	the	New	York	
Department	of	Financial	Services	and	U.S.	Treasury	refer	to	bitcoin	as	a	‘virtual’	currency.	
563	The	Brixton	pound	has	a	1:1	exchange	rate	with	British	pound	sterling,	and	sterling	that	has	been	
exchanged	for	Brixton	pounds	is	held	at	the	Brixton	Credit	Union	(London	Mutual	Credit	Union).	
564	Indeed,	many	bitcoin	proponents	would	like	to	see	it	substitute	for	and	ultimately	supplant	national	
currencies.	
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currency	definition?	Cypriot	euros,	like	all	other	non-Cypriot	euros,	could	be	legally	
used	in	Cyprus	for	the	purchase	of	goods	and	services.	However,	unlike	other	euros,	
most	Cypriot	euros	could	not	legally	be	used	in	other	Eurozone	countries	to	purchase	
goods	and	services.	This	limitation	made	a	Cypriot	euro,	in	principle,	less	valuable	than	
non-Cypriot	euros.	Based	on	the	framework	presented	in	this	paper	the	Cypriot	euro	
should	be	considered	a	parallel	currency	because	non-Cypriot	euros	could	be	used	
alongside	Cypriot	euros	inside	Cyprus.	
	
Looking	further	back	into	history	we	find	other	currencies	that	present	
classification	challenges,	such	as	the	various	banknotes	that	existed	during	the	so-
called	'free	banking'	period	in	the	United	States	during	1837-1862.565	During	this	period	
banks	issued	their	own	currencies	that	were	redeemable	at	the	issuing	bank	for	specie	
at	par.	These	banknotes	could	be	exchanged	for	goods	and	services	as	well	as	for	
banknotes	issued	by	other	banks.	However,	the	exchange	rates	on	banknotes	often	
depreciated	the	greater	the	distance	they	were	transacted	from	the	issuing	bank.566	
How	should	such	U.S.	free	banking	notes	be	classified?	In	terms	of	the	government’s	
role	in	the	free	banking	period,	banks	were	required	to	meet	certain	legal	obligations	
to	issue	banknotes,	such	as	purchasing	municipal	bonds	and	then	depositing	those	
bonds	with	the	state.	However,	most	state	governments	did	not	enforce	banknote-to-
specie	convertibility.	Klein	(1974)	provides	the	following	description:		
	
“private	bank	notes…were	all	denominated	in	dollars,	where	‘dollar’	denoted	a	
particular	weight	of	gold”;	this	period	could	thus	be	described	as	“much	closer	
to	multiple	monies	circulating	at	fixed	exchange	rates	than	to	multiple	monies	
circulating	at	flexible	exchange	rates”.567		
	
Of	note,	the	instances	of	alternative	currencies	declined	dramatically	during	the	‘U.S.	
Free	Banking’	period.568	Whether	antebellum	banknotes	should	be	classified	as	a	
national,	parallel,	alternative,	a	combination	of	the	above,	or	some	altogether	different	
currency	type	is	open	to	debate.	Similar	classification	challenges	are	confronted	when	
examining	Scottish	and	other	free	banking	systems	found	during	the	17th-19th	
																																																						
565	For	a	discussion	of	whether	the	term	'free	banking'	is	appropriate	for	this	period	see	(White,	2015)		
566	Bank	note	exchange	rates	were	published	in	newspapers	and	other	reports.	For	more	on	the	price	
differences	see	(Calomiris	&	Schweikart,	1991;	Dwyer	Jr,	1996,	pp.	5-6;	Gorton,	1996,	p.	348)	
567	(Klein,	1974,	pp.	439-440)	
568	(Harper,	1948,	p.	16).	
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centuries.569	In	sum,	the	classification	challenge	presented	by	U.S.	Free	Banking	notes	
and	the	Cypriot	euro	illustrate	some	limitations	with	the	currency	classification	
framework	presented	in	this	paper.	However,	the	vast	majority	of	currencies	fit	within	
the	Table	40	framework.	
	
6.2.3a	Four	different	alternative	currency	types	
	
There	are	at	least	six	different	types	of	alternative	currencies,	and	these	six	
currencies	can	be	grouped	into	two	overarching	categories	-	tangible	and	digital.570	
This	alternative	currency	classification	framework	is	presented	in	Table	41	and	Table	
42.	
	
Table	41:	Tangible	Alternative	Currency	Classification	Framework	
	
	 Historical	 Contemporary	
Intrinsic	
Utility	
Metals;	cigarettes	during	Second	
World	War571	
SIM	airtime	minutes572	
	 	 		
Token	
17th-19th	c.	British	tokens;	
1930s	Great	Depression-era	
scrip573	
Chiemgau;	Brixton	pound;	
BerkShares	
	
	
The	different	tangible	alternative	currency	types	are	presented	in	Table	41	in	
the	order	of	their	plausible	first	appearance	and	use	in	history.	While	our	records	of	
financial	antiquity	are	incomplete	it	is	reasonable	to	conjecture	that	items	possessing	
intrinsic	utility	or	value,	such	as	metals,	were	likely	the	earliest	alternative	currencies	
to	be	exchanged.	Intrinsic	utility	currencies	are	also	sometimes	referred	to	as	
commodity	money.	Part	of	the	value	of	intrinsic	utility	alternative	currencies	is	derived	
from	their	relative	physical	scarcity.	Such	intrinsic	currencies	obviate	the	need	for	
abstracting	a	measure	of	value,	which	is	required	with	more-conceptual	currency	
systems	described	below.	Another	advantage	of	using	an	instrument	that	possesses	
																																																						
569	See	for	example	(Rothbard,	1988;	Sechrest,	1988;	White,	1984)	
570	It	should	be	noted	that	some	instruments,	such	as	the	Brixton	pound,	have	both	a	digital	and	physical	
currency.	
571	(Radford,	1945)	
572	Unused	airtime	minutes	on	SIM	cards	are	a	common	alternative	currency	in	many	African	countries	
(Economist,	2013)	
573	(Harper,	1948)	
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widely	agreed	upon	utility	is	the	avoidance	of	geographically	bounded	use;	the	
portability	of	early	currencies	made	it	possible	for	intrinsic	currencies	to	be	used	across	
great	distances,	which	fits	with	our	understanding	of	the	nomadic	nature	of	pre-
modern	humans.	
	
Circulating	alongside	or	perhaps	even	prior	to	the	existence	of	intrinsic	
currencies	were	token	currencies.	Token	currencies	are	also	physical	currencies	but	
with	little	to	no	intrinsic	utility	or	value;	their	value	is	instead	derived	from	social	
constructs,	such	as	agreements	that	they	be	accepted	as	a	medium	of	exchange	and	
that	their	supply	be	limited.	In	recent	centuries	token	alternative	currencies	have	often	
been	issued	by	smaller	institutions,	such	as	businesses,	for	use	in	day-to-day	
transactions	with	different	stakeholders.	These	tokens	are	often	used	only	within	a	
limited	geographic	range,	such	as	a	borough,	town,	or	region,	and	are	therefore	often	
referred	to	as	‘local’	or	‘community’	currencies.	While	efforts	have	been	made	to	
significantly	expand	the	range	where	token	currencies	can	be	used,	a	link	to	a	
particular	set	of	institutions	and	or	location	are	two	of	the	defining	features	of	tangible	
token	currencies.			
	
Table	42:	Digital	Alternative	Currency	Classification	Framework	
	
	
							 																							Closed	 																																							Open	
				Centralized	
Linden	Dollar,		
World	of	Warcraft	Gold	 Flooz,	Beenz	
	Decentralized	 N/A	 Bitcoin,	Litecoin	
	
	
While	digital	alternative	currencies	have	received	a	great	deal	of	public	and	
academic	attention	of	late	they	have	been	an	active	topic	in	cryptography	and	
technology	circles	since	well	before	the	internet	became	widespread.	A	number	of	
crypto	or	e-money	efforts	failed	prior	to	bitcoin.	Benjamin	Wallace	writing	in	Wired	
(2011)	states:	
	
“Cypherpunks,	the	1990s	movement	of	libertarian	cryptographers,	dedicated	
themselves	to	the	project	(of	a	digital	alternative	currency).	Yet	every	effort	to	
create	virtual	cash	had	foundered.	Ecash,	an	anonymous	system	launched	in	
the	early	1990s	by	cryptographer	David	Chaum,	failed	in	part	because	it	
depended	on	the	existing	infrastructures	of	government	and	credit	card	
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companies.	Other	proposals	followed—bit	gold,	RPOW,	b-money—but	none	
got	off	the	ground”.574	
	
It	is	useful	to	distinguish	between	closed	and	open	digital	currencies.	Closed	
digital	currencies,	such	as	Second	Life’s	Linden	dollar,	are	largely	transacted	inside	a	
digital	virtual	world.	Linden	dollars	were	designed	for	transactions	within	the	Second	
Life	virtual	world.	However,	there	is	nothing	preventing	individuals	from	conducting	
exchanges	with	Linden	dollars	outside	of	Second	Life	and	then	arranging	settlement	
inside	Second	Life,	as	has	apparently	happened	through	auction	sites	like	eBay.	Linden	
Lab,	which	created	Second	Life,	retains	central	control	over	the	issuance	and	
governance	of	Linden	dollars.	These	two	features	make	the	Linden	dollar	both	a	closed	
and	centralized	alternative	currency.		
	
Some	community	currencies,	such	as	the	Brixton	pound,	also	have	a	digital	
equivalent	that	can	be	used	to	transact	with	the	same	goods	and	services	as	tangible	
Brixton	pound	notes.	Because	the	Brixton	pound	is	operated	by	a	central	organization,	
and	because	Brixton	pounds	are	largely	transacted	within	a	limited	geographic	range,	
Brixton	pounds	can	be	considered	to	be	both	a	tangible	and	a	closed-digital	alternative	
currency.	In	contrast,	open-digital	currencies	are	largely	unbounded	instruments	that	
can	be	transacted	outside	a	very	limited	and	clearly	demarcated	digital	environment.	
Bitcoin	is	often	characterized	as	the	world's	first	decentralized	currency.	Centralized	
digital	currencies	feature	a	single	issuer-operator	who	maintains	control	over	
important	currency	features,	such	as	supply,	use	rules,	and	other	important	functions.	
In	contrast,	decentralized	currencies	like	bitcoin	function	in	a	more	devolved	fashion	
with	open	source	software	development,	no	single	currency	issuer,	distributed	
transaction	processing,	and	a	transparent	public	ledger	(the	‘blockchain’).	However,	
there	is	considerable	debate	over	the	degree	of	bitcoin’s	decentralization.	For	
example,	in	March	2013	members	of	the	Bitcoin	community	corrected	a	fork	in	the	
blockchain	through	an	organized	effort.	Bitcoin	has	also	come	under	criticism	for	its	
highly	concentrated	mining,	ownership	of	bitcoins,	and	other	aspects.575	
	
																																																						
574	(Wallace,	2011)	
575	For	further	discussion	see	http://bitcoinmagazine.com/bitcoin-network-shaken-by-blockchain-fork/		
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Just	as	some	currencies	are	difficult	to	classify	within	the	currency	framework	
presented	in	Table	40,	several	alternative	currencies	are	not	easy	to	classify	within	
framework	presented	in	Table	41	and	Table	42.	For	example,	should	travellers’	
cheques,	which	were	first	issued	in	1772	and	widely	popularized	by	American	Express	
starting	in	1891,	be	considered	an	alternative	currency?	In	many	ways	they	resemble	
community	currencies	like	the	Brixton	pound,	which	also	has	a	fixed	1:1	exchange	rate	
with	a	national	currency.	While	traveller’s	cheques	could	historically	be	used	over	a	
much	wider	geographic	range	than	most	community	currencies	they	are	also	similar	to	
community	currencies	in	that	they	are	only	accepted	by	select	merchants	and	
institutions.	Because	travellers’	cheques	cannot	be	used	to	pay	taxes	or	settle	debts,	
and	because	they	are	physical	objects,	they	can	be	classified	as	a	tangible	alternative	
currency.	
	
Economics	textbooks	are	beginning	to	give	more	attention	to	alternative	
currencies.	For	example,	Mankiw	and	Taylor	(2011)	briefly	discuss	an	alternative	
currency	very	similar	to	the	Brixton	pound	called	the	Stroud	pound.	The	authors	
describe	how	it	“can	fulfil	many	of	the	requirements	of	national	currencies”	like	the	
British	pound.576	Restaurant	menus	in	Brixton	can	be	found	with	prices	in	Brixton	
pounds,	and	the	local	Brixton	council	government	through	a	program	called	‘Payroll	
Local’	allows	Lambeth	council	employees	to	receive	a	portion	of	their	salary	in	Brixton	
pounds.577	In	other	words,	for	a	certain	set	of	transactions	at	participating	
organizations	within	a	well-defined	geography	there	is	little	practical	difference	
between	the	Brixton	pound	and	British	pound	other	than,	similar	to	a	merchant	loyalty	
or	rewards	scheme,	you	can	often	receive	a	discount	of	10%	on	transactions	by	paying	
with	Brixton	pounds.	However,	Mankiw	and	Taylor	stop	short	of	explicitly	stating	
whether	or	not	currencies	like	the	Brixton	or	Stroud	pounds	should	be	defined	as	
money.	
	
																																																						
576	(Mankiw	&	Taylor,	2011,	p.	620)	
577	There	is	no	maximum	set	of	the	portion	of	Lambeth	Council	employees’	salaries	that	can	be	received	
in	Brixton	pounds,	but	according	to	Brixton	pound	organizers	most	who	are	participating	at	present	
receive	about	£100	Brixton	pounds	per	month.	It	is	also	advised	that	Lambeth	Council	employees	take	
no	more	than	10%	of	their	salary	in	Brixton	pounds	as	acceptance	outside	of	retailers	for	items	such	as	
housing	rent	is	more	limited.	
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While	the	terms	money	and	currency	are	often	used	synonymously	it	can	be	
useful	to	distinguish	one	from	the	other.578	As	noted	earlier	by	Ali	et	al,	some	
economists	argue	that	money’s	most	decisive	function	is	serving	as	a	unit	of	account.	
However,	other	economists	argue	that	serving	as	a	medium	of	exchange	is	money’s	
defining	feature.579	This	paper	argues	that	serving	as	a	medium	of	exchange	may	be	
more	usefully	defined	as	the	primary	function	of	currency,	but	only	one	function	of	
money.	Some	currencies,	like	the	U.S.	dollar,	widely	perform	all	three	functions	of	
money,	while	other	mediums	of	exchange	may	not	serve	as	a	widely	used	unit	of	
account.	A	precise	and	generally	agreed	upon	definition	of	what	constitutes	a	‘store	of	
value’	does	not	exist.	For	example,	some	will	argue	that	the	significant	decline	in	the	
U.S.	dollar’s	purchasing	power	over	time	due	to	inflation	makes	it	a	poor	store	of	
value,	and	it	is	certainly	true	that	there	are	both	other	currencies	(e.g.,	Swiss	franc)	
and	asset	classes	(e.g.,	equities)	which	have	over	a	long	period	served	as	a	better	store	
of	value.	However,	over	the	short-run	(e.g.,	less	than	a	month)	the	U.S.	dollar	has	
generally	effectively	stored	value	over	the	last	several	decades,	along	with	serving	as	a	
widely	used	unit	of	account	and	medium	of	exchange.	Similarly,	some	argue	that,	given	
its	relatively	high	volatility,	that	bitcoin	is	a	poor	store	of	value.	However,	others	argue	
that	bitcoin	is	a	good	store	of	value	given	its	price	appreciation	against	the	U.S.	dollar	
and	other	national	currencies	over	time.	
	
In	sum,	while	all	money	is	currency,	not	all	currency	is	money.	However,	if	an	
alternative	currency	fully	embodied	all	three	functions	of	money	then	it	could	also	be	
considered	money.	In	other	words,	the	designation	of	what	is	and	is	not	money	does	
not	depend	on	law	or	a	government	defining	such	a	currency	as	legal	tender.	
	
	 	
																																																						
578	For	a	detailed	discussion	of	modern	money	and	currency	see	(Bernstein,	1965,	Ch.	4-5)	
579	(Ali	et	al.,	2014;	Lipsey	&	Chrystal,	2011,	pp.	448,	659;	Woodford	&	WALSH,	2005)	
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6.3	Historical	Survey	of	Alternative	Currencies	
	
“It	is	believed	that	an	examination	of	the	record	of	scrip	experience	and	a	
consideration	of	the	conclusions	to	be	drawn	from	it	may	be	of	value	if	similar	
conditions	should	develop	in	the	future.”	
-William	Joel	Canady	Harper,	1948580	
	
Alternative	currencies	are	nothing	new,	and	as	noted	earlier	their	use	may	date	
as	far	back	as	the	early	classical	period.	Numismatic	works	from	the	19th	century	
perhaps	comprise	some	of	the	earliest	published	literature	on	alternative	currencies.	
This	section	of	the	paper	surveys	the	alternative	currency	literature	over	the	past	
several	hundred	years,	covering	the	regions	where	a	relatively	good	historical	record	of	
alternative	currencies	has	been	maintained,	specifically	North	America	and	Britain.	
One	aim	of	this	historical	survey	is	to	examine	whether	there	are	any	commonalties	
between	the	historical	and	contemporary	alternative	currencies,	as	well	as	the	political	
and	economic	contexts	in	which	they	arose.	
	
Before	proceeding	it	should	be	noted	that,	while	extensive	and	reliable	data	
often	exists	for	present	day	alternative	currencies,	the	same	unfortunately	cannot	be	
said	for	most	historical	alternative	currencies.581	Data	gaps	impose	some	limits	on	our	
understanding	of	the	history	of	alternative	currencies	and	present	challenges	in	some	
areas	in	making	comparisons	between	the	past	with	the	present.582	However,	sufficient	
historical	detail	and	narrative	accounts	exist	to	reveal	some	general	themes	and	
patterns	about	alternative	currencies.	
	
6.3.1	Alternative	currencies	in	North	America	
	
Prior	to	the	American	Revolution	there	are	numerous	reports	that	colonists	
made	significant	use	of	privately	produced	paper	money	issued	by	merchants	and	
																																																						
580	(Harper,	1948,	p.	12)		
581	For	a	previous	unsuccessful	effort	to	collect	quantitative	data	on	alternative	currencies	see	(Amato,	
Fantacci,	&	Doria,	2003).	
582	While	bitcoin	and	other	present	day	currencies	afford	higher	quality	data	sets	than	historical	
alternative	currencies,	it	should	be	noted	that	some	of	the	data	on	bitcoin	usage	is	difficulty	to	audit	and	
very	likely	distorted.	For	example,	bitcoin	exchange	trading	volume	is	widely	believed	to	be	inflated	for	
marketing	purposes	(Hileman,	2014a).	
	 288	
traders.583		Sylla	(1982)	summarizes	many	of	the	well-known	alternative	currencies	
used	during	this	period,	such	as	wampum,	which	was	a	shell	used	as	currency	by	
Native	Americans,	along	with	other	commodity	currencies	such	as	corn,	pelts,	rice,	and	
tobacco.584	Further	north	in	Canada,	in	1685	a	French	official	created	a	new	‘playing	
card’	currency	by	cutting	a	deck	of	cards	into	quarters,	writing	an	amounts	of	livres	on	
the	cards,	signed	his	name,	and	then	instructed	members	of	a	community	to	accept	
them.	By	1714	approximately	two	million	livres	of	depreciated	playing	card	currency	
were	in	circulation.585	Even	after	the	founding	of	the	Boston	mint	in	1652	there	are	
reports	of	merchant	issued	currency,	and	complaints	of	currency	‘hoarding’	during	
economic	downturns	persist	well	into	the	18th	century.586	Such	complaints	can	be	taken	
as	evidence	of	the	continued	importance	of	alternative	currencies	following	the	
introduction	of	government	supported	currency	in	America.587		
	
Given	the	frequency	with	which	inflation	accompanies	war	it	is	not	surprising	
that	there	was	a	proliferation	of	alternative	currencies	during	the	American	
Revolution,	where	lottery	tickets,	private	tokens	(shinplasters),	and	other	mediums	of	
exchange	circulated.588	In	post-revolutionary	America	banks	frequently	failed,	which	
often	led	to	financial	panics	and	shortages	in	small	denomination	currency	in	
particular.	In	these	environments	various	forms	of	alternative	currency	proliferated,	
including	notes	issued	by	cities,	states,	individuals,	merchants,	and	churches.589	This	
shortage	of	small	denominations	of	currency	is	a	phenomenon	that	has	been	referred	
to	as	‘The	Big	Problem	of	Small	Change’,	a	phrase	that	was	originally	introduced	by	
Cipolla	(1956)	and	elaborated	on	by	Sargent	and	Velde	(2002)	and	others.590	According	
to	Sargent	and	Velde,	the	problem	of	not	enough	small	change	was	rooted	in	two	
issues:	poor	economic	theory	and	inadequate	technology.591	This	‘Big	Problem’	has	in	
fact	been	the	driving	force	behind	the	introduction	of	a	number	of	alternative	
																																																						
583	(McLeod,	1898,	pp.	229-230)	
584	(Sylla,	1982)	
585	(Chalmers,	1893,	p.	118;	Del	Mar,	1899,	p.	118)	
586	(Sumner,	1874,	p.	26)	
587	(Harper,	1948,	p.	10)		
588	(Del	Mar,	1899,	p.	116)	
589	(Harper,	1948,	pp.	14-15)	
590	See	for	example	(Kohn,	2005,	Ch.	7)	
591	(Sargent	&	Velde,	2002,	p.	XVIII)	
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currencies.592	For	example,	in	1792	the	town	of	Albany	in	New	York	state	introduced	
small	notes	to	address	the	chronic	shortage	of	smaller	denominations.593	
	
In	the	decades	immediately	following	the	adoption	of	the	U.S.	Constitution	up	
through	the	Civil	War	bank	money	played	a	more	important	role	even	though	various	
alternative	currencies	issued	by	private	individuals	and	merchants,	as	well	as	those	by	
local	governments,	continued	to	circulate.	A	noticeable	decline	in	alternative	
currencies	was	witnessed	during	the	‘U.S.	Free	Banking’	era	of	1837-1862	–	a	period	of	
relative	peace	from	military	conflict.	However,	Harper	(1948)	notes	that	“the	
proportion	of	local	non-bank	instruments	tended	to	increase	as	banks	failed	with	each	
period	of	crisis	and	depression,	and	to	diminish	with	the	revival	of	business”.594	
	
Once	criticism	of	Harper’s	study	of	this	earlier	period	that	should	be	noted	is	his	
tendency	to	conflate	credit	and	money	(or	currency).	For	example,	he	described	pre-
revolutionary	‘loan	bills’,	such	as	due	bills	and	shop	notes,	which	were	used	by	
‘gentlemen	of	substance’	(individuals	and	merchants)	as	local	money.595	His	description	
states	that	these	provided	“evidences	of	indebtedness”	and	contains	no	discussion	of	
whether	these	bills	circulated	as	currency.	These	and	other	debt	instruments	he	
describes	may	more	aptly	be	termed	credit	rather	than	currency	or	money.	Harper	
does,	however,	highlight	a	number	of	alternative	currencies	before	the	Great	
Depression,	such	as	a	system	during	the	U.S.	Revolutionary	War	period	where	
merchants	discounted	each	other’s	bills.	
	
During	the	Great	Depression	various	alternative	currencies	referred	to	by	
Harper	as		‘scrip’	were	widely	used	throughout	the	United	States	and	Europe,	including	
commodity	notes	exchangeable	for	goods	and	services	as	well	as	municipal	notes.	596		
The	scrip	which	Harper	focuses	on	was	that	issued	by	chambers	of	commerce	and	local	
governments;	self-help	groups,	merchant	groups,	and	others	private	actors	also	issued	
																																																						
592	(Cipolla,	1956;	Sargent	&	Velde,	2002)	
593	(Carothers,	1967)	
594	(Harper,	1948,	pp.	14-15)	
595	(Harper,	1948,	p.	9)	
596	(Harper,	1948,	p.	7,	Figure	1)	Harper’s	thesis	contains	a	map	that	plots	the	different	types	of	scrip	
used	in	different	parts	of	the	U.S.	For	European	alternative	currencies	from	this	period	see	(Amato	et	al.,	
2003,	p.	1)	
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scrip.	Similar	to	today’s	local	complementary	currencies	like	the	Brixton	pound,	one	
purpose	of	this	Great	Depression-era	scrip	was	to	limit	out-of-town	expenditures	or	
purchases	at	non-local	chain	stores.597	Similar	to	today’s	Freicoin,	many	U.S.	scrip	
currencies	and	the	Austrian	Freigeld	incorporated	demurrage,	an	economic	concept	of	
developed	by	economist	Silvio	Gesell	that	is	designed	to	reduce	price	deflation	by	
encouraging	spending.598		
	
A	number	of	challenges	faced	by	Great	Depression-era	scrip	are	also	commonly	
seen	in	today’s	alternative	currencies.	For	example,	alternative	currencies	often	
struggle	to	gain	wider	acceptance.	Practical	operational	issues,	such	as	poor	paper	
quality	and	not	having	enough	physical	space	on	the	scrip	note	for	stamps,	are	also	
quite	common.	The	most	significant	problem	confronting	1930s	scrip	was	the	need	
many	had	to	purchase	goods	and	services	outside	the	local	community,	where	the	
particular	scrip	was	not	accepted.	Efforts	aimed	at	addressing	this	problem	included	
establishing	local	clearinghouses,	inter-community	barter	exchanges,	and	a	national	
scrip	plan,	were	met	with	varying	degrees	of	success	and	failure.	Harper	states	that	the	
national	scrip	plan	proposal	was	“rejected	by	Congress	in	favor	of	plans	by	the	
Secretary	of	the	Treasury	and	the	Federal	Reserve	Board	for	an	increase	in	the	paper	
currency	issues	of	the	Federal	Reserve	Banks”.599		
	
6.3.2	Alternative	currencies	in	Europe	
	
	 In	16th	and	17th	century	England	alternative	currencies,	commonly	referred	to	
as	token	currency	in	the	literature,	came	into	widespread	use.	The	term	token	appears	
to	have	a	number	of	uses.	For	example,	Sargent	and	Velde	define	the	term	token	as	“a	
stamped	piece	of	metal,	often	coin,	issued	as	a	medium	of	exchange	by	a	private	
person	or	company	who	promises	to	exchange	it	for	its	nominal	value	for	goods	or	
legal	currency”.600	However,	not	all	token	currency	has	always	been	metal.	Further,	
currencies	described	as	tokens	were	sometimes	issued	by	public	entities,	such	as	cities.	
																																																						
597	(Harper,	1948,	pp.	1-2)	
598	(Harper,	1948,	p.	3)	Demurrage	incorporates	a	penalty	for	holding	money.	For	example,	stamps	with	
dates	are	affixed	to	scrip	at	regular	intervals	to	indicate	the	depreciated	value	of	the	instrument.	Harper	
notes	that	‘transaction’	stamps	were	more	common	than	the	‘time’	stamp	system	described	by	Gesell	
(Gesell,	1929).	
599	(Harper,	1948,	pp.	5-6)		
600	(Sargent	&	Velde,	2002,	p.	376)	
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There	is	also	significant	evidence	of	earlier	use	in	England	and	throughout	other	
areas	of	Europe	during	the	medieval	period.	Evidence	of	medieval	token	use	has	
primarily	been	obtained	in	the	more	financially	sophisticated	regions	in	Europe	during	
this	period	of	Flanders,	northern	France	and	Italy,	and	Catalonia.	In	contrast	with	
England,	in	France	and	the	Low	Countries	token	currency	was	suppressed	through	
government	action.601	Tokens	were	issued	for	two	reasons:	first,	in	response	to	the	
aforementioned	shortage	of	smaller	currency	units;	second,	due	to	inconveniences	
associated	with	using	silver,	which	due	to	its	small	weight	and	size	was	often	lost.	In	
1594	Queen	Elizabeth	gave	the	Mayor	of	the	Corporation	of	Bristol	approval	to	mint	a	
‘Corporation	farthing’,	which	gained	a	wide	circulation	and	was	able	to	maintain	its	
value.602	Tradesmen	also	issued	lead	coins	up	through	the	early	17th	century.	
	
English	token	currency	were	in	the	words	of	Boyne	and	Williamson	(1889)	a	
“money	of	necessity”.	Echoing	the	tone	and	language	one	often	finds	surrounding	
today’s	alternative	currency	movements,	Boyne	and	Williamson	continue:			
	
“they	(tokens)	would	never	have	been	issued	but	for	the	indifference	of	a	
Government	to	a	public	need,	and	their	issue	forms	a	remarkable	instance	of	a	
people	supplying	their	own	needs	by	an	illegal	issue	of	coinage,	and	in	this	way	
forcing	a	legislature	to	comply	with	demands	and	requests	at	once	just	and	
imperative”603		
	
Boyne	and	Williamson	also	state	that	token	currency	was	illegal,	which	based	on	the	
historical	record	appears	to	be	true	for	at	least	some	of	this	period.	However,	it	does	
not	appear	that	these	alternative	currencies	were	at	all	times	illegal,	such	as	the	
instance	noted	in	this	paper	when	Bristol	was	authorized	to	issue	its	own	local	
currency	in	1594.	As	noted	by	Sargent	and	Velde,	“in	England,	where	the	mint	
																																																						
601	(Sargent	&	Velde,	2002,	pp.	216-218)	
602	(Searle	&	Cambridge	Antiquarian	Society.,	1871,	p.	42)	Given	the	fact	that	the	crown	approved	the	
minting	of	Bristol’s	‘Corporation	farthing’	it	could	be	argued	that	this	was	not	in	fact	a	pure	alternative	
currency.	There	may	also	be	some	confusion	or	disagreement	on	the	exact	date	as	Sargent	and	Velde	
report	a	similar	instance	of	Queen	Elizabeth	approving	a	lead	token	to	be	used	within	10	miles	of	Bristol	
in	1582	(Sargent	&	Velde,	2002,	pp.	217-218)	
603	(Boyne	&	Williamson,	1889,	p.	b-2)		
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produced	very	few	small	denominations,	tokens	were	tolerated	and	at	times	officially	
authorized”.604	
	
The	year	of	1648	is	the		first	in	which	tokens	are	reported	to	have	begun	
appearing	in	wider	circulation.605	During	the	17th	–	19th	century	the	issuance	of	tokens	
became	widespread	throughout	England,	Wales	and	Ireland.606	A	shortage	of	‘low	value	
copper	coinage’	in	17th	century	Great	Britain	afflicted	trade	and	the	government	did	
not	address	the	shortage	by	minting	more	‘regal	coinage’,	which	was	made	of	gold	and	
silver.	Copper,	which	had	been	used	for	money	in	earlier	centuries	during	feudal	times,	
was	considered	“unfitting	for	the	head	of	the	monarch”.607	In	1404	the	House	of	
Commons	had	been	petitioned	to	solve	lack	of	small	coins	by	minting	lead	tokens.	
Queen	Elizabeth	first	created	a	pattern	for	coins	to	be	minted	off	of	a	base	metal	but	
perhaps	only	Bristol	issued	any,	which	were	used	only	in	a	10-mile	radius	of	the	city.	
The	Romans	had	also	used	copper	coins,	and	many	European	countries	used	copper	by	
1651.		
	
As	a	result	of	the	shortage	of	small	change,	businesses	and	local	authorities	
minted	their	own	copper	coins	‘without	authority’.608	A	wide	swath	of	the	British	
economy	minted	farthing,	halfpenny,	penny	and	tokens	in	the	17th	century	as	show	in	
Table	43.	In	addition	to	commercial	establishments	a	number	of	somewhat	more	
eclectic	organizations	and	institutions	issued	tokens,	including	workhouses,	
churchyards,	colleges	and	prisons.	
	
	 	
																																																						
604	(Sargent	&	Velde,	2002,	p.	217)	
605	(Searle	&	Cambridge	Antiquarian	Society.,	1871,	p.	43)	
606	(Boyne	&	Williamson,	1891;	Mathias	&	Barrington	Brown,	1962;	Whiting,	1971)	
607	(Whiting,	1971,	pp.	13-14,	16)	
608	(Searle	&	Cambridge	Antiquarian	Society.,	1871,	p.	43)	
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Table	43:	Issuers	of	Alternative	Currency,	17th	Century	Britain	
	
Sector	 Examples	
Shops	 grocers,	butcher,	baker,	haberdasher,	tobacco	sellers,	spectacle	makers,	
pewter	shops,	furrier,	bookshop,	cap-maker	
Vittles*	 coffee	houses,	inns,	taverns,	pubs	
Industry	 tallow	chandler,	weaver,	clothier,	leatherworker,	goldsmiths,	oilmen,	
brushmaker,	ironmonger,	coal	mining,	
Services	 barber,	barber-surgeons,	apothecary	
Transportation	 coachmen,	wagoner,	canal	in	18th	century	
Communication	 postal	service	
Institutions	 workhouses,	colleges	(Chelsea	College	c.	1667),	churchyards		(Flemish,	
London),	prisons	(Newgate	c.1669)	
Politics	 political	coins	used	for	“spreading	propaganda,	subversive	agitation	or	
other	forms	of	advertisement”	
*Issued	over	1,000	tokens,	which	was	more	than	any	industry	sector.	
	
Source:	Whiting	1971,	pp.	34-44,	59,	76-7	
	
	
	 These	tokens	have	been	described	as	“ingenious	in	their	style”	and	generally	
contained	information	about	the	trade	of	the	issuer	and	their	location.609		Tradesmen	
often	kept	a	sorting	box	so	that	they	could	keep	track	of	the	various	tokens	produced	
by	other	merchants	that	they	received	in	exchange.	And	in	cities	like	London	there	are	
parallels	with	modern	alternative	currency	ecosystem	firms,	with	‘farthing	changers’	
operating	as	market	makers	and	issuing	their	own	tokens.610	Efforts	at	regulating	the	
burgeoning	token	market	were	introduced	as	early	as	1655	and	again	in	1669	until	a	
proclamation	was	made	by	the	King	of	England	in	July	1672	that	“no	person	or	persons	
should	for	the	future	make,	coin,	exchange	or	use	any	farthings	or	tokens	except	such	
as	should	be	coined	in	his	Majesty’s	mint”.611	
	
Tokens	continued	to	be	minted	for	some	time	despite	repeated	proclamations	
from	the	crown	that	offenders	were	to	be	prosecuted	for	issuing	private	tokens.	At	
last,	a	proclamation	in	December	1674	appears	to	have	succeeded	in	halting	private	
																																																						
609	(Searle	&	Cambridge	Antiquarian	Society.,	1871,	p.	45)	
610	(Searle	&	Cambridge	Antiquarian	Society.,	1871,	p.	46)	
611	(Searle	&	Cambridge	Antiquarian	Society.,	1871,	p.	47)	Possibly	referencing	the	shortage	of	money	
that	the	tokens	were	issued	to	address,	the	proclamation	continues	“his	Majesty	having	given	directions	
for	the	speedy	making	of	a	considerable	quantity	of	farthings,	to	be	made	current	for	exchange	of	
monies”.	
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token	issuance	for	over	a	century612,	until	reports	surfaced	of	widespread	
counterfeiting	of	coins	from	the	official	mint	lead	to	the	reactivation	of	the	private	
token	market	in	1784.613	In	sum,	while	their	circulation	was	interrupted	merchant	
tokens	in	Britain	appear	to	be	on	the	more	long-lived,	and	therefore	successful,	
alternative	currencies.	
	
6.3.3	Alternative	currencies	around	the	World	
	 	 	
While	there	is	significant	evidence	that	alternative	currencies	were	not	simply	a	
North	Atlantic	phenomenon,	there	is	not	nearly	as	much	historical	information	on	
alternative	currencies	in	other	regions	of	the	world.	For	example,	in	19th	century	Japan	
both	Lietaer	(2004)	and	Maruyama	(1994,	1999)	note	that	alternative	currencies	were	
operational.	Japan	also	played	a	role	in	developing	alternative	currency	systems	in	the	
post-Second	World	War	period.614	Today,	it	is	estimated	that	over	600	active	
alternative	currencies	exist	in	Japan.	Lietaer,	echoing	the	sentiment	expressed	by	
scholars	studying	alternative	currencies	during	the	Great	Depression,	references	the	
general	economic	problems	that	Japan	has	suffered	since	1990	as	an	explanatory	
factor	in	why	alternative	currencies	have	been	maintained	interest	in	the	country.	He	
does	not,	however,	argue	that	there	is	a	link	between	alternative	currencies	and	
specific	economic	factors	in	Japan,	such	as	deflation	or	low	or	negative	economic	
growth.	He	also	suggests	that	these	efforts	had	previously	been	largely	overlooked	due	
to	the	fact	that	women	organized	them.	
	
Other	recent	scholarship	on	20th	century	and	contemporary	alternative	
currencies	includes	research	by	Tibbett	(1997),	Amato	et	al	(2003),	and	North	(2007).	
615	Tibbet’s	contemporary	survey	of	alternative	currencies	in	existence	examined	their	
role	as	a	form	of	protest	against	globalization.	In	recent	times	alternative	currencies	
have	gained	traction	in	British	Commonwealth	countries,	such	as	New	Zealand	and	
Australia.		
	
																																																						
612	(Searle	&	Cambridge	Antiquarian	Society.,	1871,	p.	48)	
613	(Searle	&	Cambridge	Antiquarian	Society.,	1871,	p.	118)	
614	(Lietaer,	2004,	pp.	3-4)		
615	(Amato	et	al.,	2003;	North,	2007;	Tibbett,	1997)	
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6.3.4	Historical	summary	
	
Many	similarities	can	be	seen	in	the	conditions	that	gave	rise	to	history’s	
alternative	currencies	and	today’s.	Commenting	on	the	use	of	‘local	money’	in	the	U.S.	
prior	to	1932,	Harper	anticipates	the	return	of	alternative	currencies	in	remarks	about	
the	relationship	between	Great	Depression-era	and	earlier	alternatives	currencies,	
which:	
	
“resulted	from	conditions	sufficiently	like	those	of	the	recent	depression	to	
suggest	the	possibility	that	local	money	in	some	form	is	likely	to	recur	in	
response	to	a	public	demand	under	substantially	similar	circumstances”.616	
	
Throughout	history	and	today	there	appear	to	be	seven	principle	socio-
economic	factors	that	drive	demand	for	alternative	currencies	(Table	44).617	Of	note,	
historical	precedent	is	found	for	all	of	these	forces	except	environmentalism.	
	
Table	44:	Socio-Economic	Forces	Driving	Demand	for	Alternative	Currencies	
	
Force	 Description	
Environmentalism	 Concerns	over	environmental	impact	of	globalization,	‘peak	oil’,	
industrial	agriculture		
Localism	 Protect	‘high	street’	retailers,	neighbourly	commerce	
Technology	 Open	source	software	creates	low	barriers	to	entry;	widespread	
use	of	mobile	devices	
Economic	Sentiment	 Concerns	over	inequality,	quantitative	easing,	inflation,	‘Too	Big	
to	Fail’,	high	unemployment,	slow	growth,	high	debt,	financial	
insecurity	
Inefficiencies	 Slow	and	expensive	financial	system	(e.g.,	2-3%	credit	card	
charges)	
Financial	repression		 Growing	use	of	capital	controls	(e.g.,	Eurozone,	Argentina,	China)	
Speculation	 Currency	appreciation	due	to	wider	use	and	acceptance	(e.g.,	
bitcoin)	
	
In	examining	the	history	of	alternative	currencies	that	have	either	ceased	to	
exist	or	are	in	decline,	three	main	causes	would	appear	to	dominate	-	technological	
																																																						
616	(Harper,	1948,	p.	2)		
617	(Hileman,	2014b)	
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change,	government	intervention,	demand	shortage.	Advancements	in	technology	
have	either	disrupted	or	obviated	the	need	for	alternative	currency.	For	example,	the	
final	decline	and	cessation	of	British	merchant	tokens	in	the	19th	century	occurred	
alongside	the	development	of	the	standard	formula	described	by	Sargent	and	Velde	
for	determining	the	proper	mix	of	small	change	(demand	as	opposed	to	supply	driven),	
as	well	as	technological	advances	in	minting	which	made	the	production	of	small	coins	
less	expensive.	Both	the	technological	advance	in	economic	theory	and	manufacturing	
processes	combined	to	eliminate	the	persistent	shortage	of	small	coins.	
	
	 Throughout	the	history	of	alternative	currencies	governments	have	periodically	
intervened	to	reduce	or	eliminate	the	use	of	such	currencies.	One	example	is	the	
Austrian	Freigeld	currency,	which	was	introduced	in	1932	and	was	outlawed	by	the	
Austrian	central	bank	in	1933.	What	is	not	entirely	clear	is	whether	the	Freigeld	was	
shut	down	due	to	how	similar	it	appeared	to	the	normal	Austrian	schilling	or	because	
the	authorities	feared	that	the	upstart	currency	might	gain	more	widespread	adoption.	
Regardless,	lack	of	sustainable	demand	appears	to	be	by	far	the	leading	cause	of	
alternative	currency	decline.	Early	scholarship	notes	the	persistent	difficulty	that	
alternative	currencies	face	in	gaining	wide	and	sustained	adoption.	More	recently,	the	
UK	LETS	scheme	is	illustrative	of	this	difficulty.	While	LETS	is	still	functioning	it	has	
experienced	a	steady	decline,	having	gone	from	350	chapters	in	1995,	to	303	in	2001,	
and	now	186	in	2005.618	Overall,	LETS	simply	has	not	been	compelling	or	convenient	
enough	to	sustain	its	early	momentum.	However,	such	difficulties	have	not	stopped	
the	advent	of	new	community	currencies,	like	the	Brixton	pound,	that	do	away	with	
the	LETS	barter	approach	to	currency.	
	 	
																																																						
618	(North,	2007)	
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6.4	Conclusion	
	
	 What	does	the	persistent	pattern	of	decline	observed	for	many	alternative	
currencies	in	history	suggest	about	the	prospects	for	contemporary	alternative	
currencies?	In	comparing	bitcoin	with	the	Brixton	pound,	it	is	the	Brixton	pound	–	
which	is	largely	representative	of	many	of	today’s	local	currencies	–	that	most	closely	
resembles	past	historical	alternative	currencies.	Even	with	support	from	local	
government	and	the	technological	advances	that	the	Brixton	pound	employs	it	appears	
to	be	suffering	from	many	of	the	same	challenges	faced	by	its	historical	predecessors.	
In	short,	very	few	people	live	their	entire	lives	inside	a	geographic	area	as	small	as	
Brixton,	and	this	creates	a	fundamental	limitation	and	inefficiency	with	holding	Brixton	
pounds.	
	
Bitcoin	is	arguably	already	perhaps	the	world’s	most	successful	alternative	
currency	in	terms	of	its	breadth	of	use,	market	value,	and	mindshare.	Bitcoin	possesses	
many	new	features	that	distinguish	it	from	historical	alternative	currencies,	including	
its	relatively	decentralized	structure,	efficient	cross-border	transactions,	global	brand	
awareness,	and	support	from	powerful	institutions.	For	an	alternative	currency,	the	
bitcoin	currency’s	achievements	to	date	are	both	significant	and	impressive.	However,	
bitcoin	faces	many	challenges,	one	of	which	is	the	volatility	of	its	exchange	rate	against	
national	currencies	like	the	U.S.	dollar.	It	is	unlikely	that	many	people	feel	comfortable	
holding	such	a	volatile	store	of	value	for	certain	uses,	such	as	for	monthly	rent	or	other	
similarly	important	payments.	Unless	bitcoin’s	volatility	stabilizes	it	is	unlikely	that	it	
will	ever	become	a	widely	used	unit	of	account	and	thereby	meet	the	definition	of	
money.	
	
While	bitcoin's	decentralized	nature	perhaps	gives	the	appearance	of	limiting	
some	of	the	regulatory	risk	that	has	led	to	the	demise	of	past	alternative	currencies,	
regulators	still	have	many	ways	to	slow	or	curtail	the	use	of	a	decentralized	currency	
like	bitcoin.	For	example,	governments	can	prevent	bitcoin	from	integrating	into	the	
global	payment	and	banking	systems,	as	well	as	limit	access	to	technology	platforms	
like	the	Google	and	Apple	application	platforms	where	bitcoin	software	can	be	easily	
obtained	by	users.		
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Government	interest	in	bitcoin	will	in	part	depend	upon	bitcoin’s	level	of	use.	
In	the	short-run	governments	will	be	primarily	interested	in	its	use	for	illegal	activity,	
such	as	in	the	purchase	of	illicit	goods	and	tax	evasion.	Looking	ahead,	central	banks	
(with	a	few	exceptions)	have	to	date	generally	taken	a	rather	benign	view	of	bitcoin.	
However,	were	bitcoin	or	another	alternative	currency	to	gain	wider	adoption	then	
governments	may	grow	concerned	about	the	impact	it	could	have	on	the	money	
supply	and	the	ability	of	central	banks	to	conduct	monetary	policy.		
	
	 Perhaps	the	most	important	difference	between	bitcoin	and	past	alternative	
currencies	is	the	distributed	timestamp	ledger	on	which	bitcoin	transactions	are	
recorded,	called	the	blockchain.	This	distributed	ledger	has	the	capacity	to	be	used	for	
many	non-currency	functions,	such	as	for	notary	services,	recording	property	title	
changes,	election	voting,	and	novel	products	and	service	offerings	such	as	smart	
contracts.	Ironically,	perhaps	the	many	promising	non-currency	uses	for	bitcoin’s	
underlying	technology	may	hold	the	key	to	bitcoin’s	ability	to	survive	and	thrive	as	a	
currency.	
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7	Conclusion	
	
	
This	conclusion	summarizes	some	of	the	key	research	findings	from	this	thesis,	
outlines	some	of	the	limitations	encountered	during	research	and	how	they	might	be	
addressed	in	future	research,	and	discusses	policy	implications.		
	
An	effort	was	made	in	this	thesis	to	address	the	following	research	questions:	
First,	what	options	are	available	to	a	country	facing	an	unsustainable	level	of	sovereign	
debt?	Second,	how	well	do	existing	economic	frameworks	account	for	political	and	
other	non-quantitative	aspects	of	sovereign	debt	sustainability?	Third,	how	
comprehensive	are	existing	frameworks	for	measuring	sovereign	credit	events?	
Fourth,	what	role	does	financial	repression	play	in	debt	sustainability,	and	how	well	do	
existing	methods	for	measuring	financial	repression	perform?	Fifth,	what	can	
monetary	innovation	in	the	form	of	currency	black	markets,	which	are	a	sometime	by-
product	of	financial	repression,	say	about	the	effectiveness	of	financial	repression?	
Sixth,	what	do	free	currency	markets	suggest	were	the	key	historical	turning	points	
during	the	1940s?		Seventh,	how	do	other	forms	of	monetary	innovation,	such	as	
alternative	currencies,	fit	into	an	overall	currency	framework,	and	under	what	
circumstances	do	alternative	currencies	rise	and	decline?		
	
As	shown	in	the	literature	review,	our	understanding	of	the	role	of	financial	
markets	in	the	1940s	and	the	effects	they	had	on	policy	is	incomplete	at	best.	One	of	
the	main	contributions	of	this	thesis	is	to	bring	a	market-based,	financial	perspective	to	
mid-20th	century	economic	and	historical	scholarship.	What	happens	in	free	currency	
markets	can	have	an	impact	on	sovereign	debt	sustainability,	as	was	shown	with	
Britain	and	the	free	sterling	markets.	Currency	black	markets	in	New	York	and	
Switzerland	undermined	confidence	in	Britain’s	solvency	and	led	to	damaging	capital	
flight	during	the	1947	Convertibility	Crisis,	as	well	as	the	lead-up	to	sterling’s	
devaluation	in	1949.	The	new	archival	data	presented	suggests	that	these	markets	may	
have	played	an	even	greater	role	than	previously	believed	in	guiding	the	choice	of	a	
new	exchange	rate	for	sterling	during	the	September	1949	devaluation	deliberations.	
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This	thesis	has	also	shown	that,	to	address	its	debt	sustainability	challenge,	
Britain	partially	defaulted	on	the	Anglo-American	loan.	Britain	also	engaged	in	various	
forms	of	financial	repression,	which	helped	the	government	pay	less	interest	on	its	
public	debt	and	to	ensure	a	cooperative	marketplace	for	placing	new	government	debt	
issues.	These	measures	were	effective	in	easing	Britain’s	post-Second	World	War	
public	debt	burden.	
	
An	interesting	counterfactual	question	is	what	would	have	happened	to	market	
confidence	had	Britain	emphasized	or	employed	other	sovereign	debt	sustainability	
mechanisms	outlined	in	chapter	2?	For	example,	the	British	Empire	in	1945	was	still	in	
possession	of	substantial	hard	and	soft	assets.	As	a	crisis	mitigation	tool,	could	the	
Empire	have	calmed	market	concerns	through	more	effective	bargaining	and	trading?	
While	the	second	chapter	highlighted	some	recent	examples	of	debt	sustainability-
driven	asset	exchanges,	further	research	is	required	on	how	common	a	practice	
exchanging	assets	was	for	debt	assistance,	and	what	the	overall	impact	from	such	
trading	has	had	on	debt	sustainability	and	other	economic	factors.		
	
Similarly,	given	that	Britain’s	efforts	to	maintain	sterling’s	exchange	rate	proved	
futile,	would	Britain	have	been	better	off	devaluing	sterling	earlier?	Further,	given	
sterling’s	subsequent	devaluation	in	1967,	should	Britain	have	devalued	sterling	by	an	
even	greater	amount	in	1949?	These	are	complex	but	important	questions.	At	the	time	
of	this	writing	there	is	considerable	debate	and	uncertainty	over	whether,	for	example,	
Greece	and	other	Eurozone	countries	facing	economic	growth	and	debt	sustainability	
challenges	would	thrive	or	suffer	by	effecting	a	devaluation	and	or	leaving	the	euro.	
Previous	examples	of	currency	union	exits,	including	the	Soviet	ruble,	the	Austrian-
Hungarian	crown,	and	the	Yugoslavian	dinar,	are	inconclusive.	Further	examination	of	
the	economic	impact	of	sterling’s	devaluation	motivates	further	study	and	could	add	
something	important	to	the	current	debate	over	the	future	of	the	Eurozone.	
	
A	further	contribution	made	by	this	thesis	is	providing	an	advanced	country	
case	study	of	currency	black	markets,	financial	repression,	and	sovereign	debt	stability,	
which	are	typically	studied	in	the	context	of	a	developing	economy.	Many	of	today’s	
biggest	economic	challenges	are	seated	in	advanced	economies.	Previous	findings	
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from	studies	of	emerging	market	economies,	which	are	often	much	smaller	in	size	and	
may	owe	debts	in	foreign	denominated	currencies,	may	not	be	entirely	applicable	for	
understanding	problems	in	advanced	countries.	The	study	of	Britain	makes	a	
contribution	towards	our	understanding	of	these	economic	challenges	in	advanced	
economies	and	may	prove	useful	to	policymakers.	
	
As	highlighted	in	the	introduction,	economic	historians	have	almost	entirely	
overlooked	the	role	of	debt	in	British	post-Second	World	War	economic	history.	Basic	
measures	of	debt	sustainability,	such	as	debt-to-income,	are	not	included	in	much	of	
the	existing	literature	on	mid-20th	century	British	economic	history.	While	there	is	no	
evidence	that	Britain	failed	to	meet	any	of	its	agreed	upon	interest	or	principal	
payments,	the	evidence	is	clear	that	Britain	defaulted	on	the	Anglo-American	Financial	
Agreement	in	the	form	of	failing	to	meet	its	contractual	obligation	of	sterling	
convertibility	and	open	trade.	This	thesis	has	also	shown	how	the	existing	framework	
used	by	economic	historians	for	measuring	important	credit	events	is	too	simplistic	to	
capture	‘partial	defaults’,	such	as	Britain’s.	One	important	question	not	explored	in	the	
thesis	is	the	impact	that	Britain’s	record-setting	debt	levels	may	have	had	on	its	
comparatively	poor	economic	performance	in	the	decades	following	the	Second	World	
War.	There	is	a	substantial	literature	on	the	question	of	why	Britain	underperformed	
its	peer	countries	following	the	war,	and	yet	the	subject	of	Britain’s	dramatically	higher	
debt	burden	has	received	almost	no	prior	attention.	
	
Recent	claims	made	by	academics	and	policymakers	on	financial	repression	in	
the	post-Second	World	War	period	have	been	scrutinized	in	Chapter	4	and	were	found	
to	be,	at	least	in	the	case	of	Britain,	in	need	of	further	examination	and	clarification.	
Ample	evidence	of	policies	and	practices	in	Britain	that	are	typically	associated	with	
financial	repression	are	found	in	archival	documents	and	the	literature.	However,	
quantitative	evidence	from	the	bond	market	and	other	sources	makes	clear	that	British	
financial	repression	was	not	‘absolute’,	or	a	case	of	‘total’	financial	repression,	at	least	
compared	to	more	restrictive	and	effective	financial	repression	regimes	than	Britain’s.	
Chapter	4	critiques	existing	quantitative	methods	for	measuring	financial	repression	
and	shows	that	the	British	government	likely	generated	substantial	financial	repression	
‘savings’	from	below	market	public	debt	interest	rates.	However,	as	noted	in	the	
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chapter,	caution	is	necessary	in	placing	too	much	weight	on	this	new	calculation	of	
British	financial	repression	savings	given	the	paucity	of	data	on	free	bond	yields.	More	
free	market	real	bond	yield	data,	or	the	calculation	of	an	acceptable	synthetic	bond	
yield,	could	offer	a	more	precise	and	robust	calculation	of	savings	due	to	British	
financial	repression.		
	
Chapter	4	also	highlighted	the	importance	of	additional	measures	of	financial	
repression,	such	as	the	use	of	a	compositor	index	to	compare	the	varying	degrees	of	
financial	repression	across	different	countries.	Much	of	the	data	necessary	to	create	
such	an	index	for	Britain	during	the	mid-20th	century	either	does	not	exist	or	has	not	
yet	been	located.	However,	such	an	index	could	be	constructed	for	present	day	
countries	using	contemporary	sources	and	will	be	presented	in	a	forthcoming	paper.	
	
The	final	two	chapters	explore	two	forms	of	monetary	innovation:	currency	
black	markets	and	alternative	currencies.	Periods	of	financial	regulation	and	economic	
uncertainty	often	prompt	monetary	innovation,	as	was	seen	in	the	1940s.	The	new	
data	introduced	in	this	thesis	from	free	currency	markets	in	Switzerland	and	New	York	
provides	one	of	the	few	market	perspectives	during	a	time	of	heavy	financial	
regulation.	Statistical	tests	on	this	data	highlight	the	market’s	view	of	key	historical	
turning	points	during	the	1940s.	However,	there	is	much	we	can	still	learn	from	further	
study	of	these	markets.	For	example,	we	have	limited	information	about	volume	and	
market	participants,	nor	do	we	possess	data	on	the	transactions	costs	associated	with	
these	markets.	The	significant	arbitrage	opportunities	seen	in	the	years	immediately	
following	the	Second	World	War	and	the	subsequent	decline	in	arbitrage	profit	
opportunities	present	another	interesting	question	for	further	study.	Further,	can	free	
currency	market	data	serve	as	an	acceptable	proxy	for	a	forward	exchange	rate	
market,	enabling	the	calculation	of	a	synthetic	‘free’	interest	rate	that	could	be	used	
for	a	more	refined	calculation	of	financial	repression	savings?	
	
Perhaps	due	to	the	problems	alternative	currencies	faced	in	gaining	wider	
adoption	in	the	1930s	and	their	relatively	short	lifespan,	there	were	fewer	‘tokenized’	
alternative	currencies	in	the	1940s	than	during	the	Great	Depression.	Market	
participants	seeking	an	alternative	to	official	national	currencies	instead	either	
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favoured	commodity	alternative	currencies,	such	as	cigarettes	in	Germany,	or	black	
market	national	currencies.	The	substantial	quantity	of	British	sterling	and	dollar	
banknotes	purportedly	available	outside	both	countries	may	have	also	served	to	tamp	
down	the	introduction	of	new	alternative	currencies	during	the	1940s.	Sterling	and	the	
U.S.	dollar	were	both	important	global	reserve	currencies	and	arguably	far	superior	in	
terms	of	their	acceptance	in	various	geographies	compared	to	an	alternative	currency.	
In	short,	black	market	national	currencies	may	have	largely	obviated	the	need	for	
alternative	currencies	in	the	latter-half	of	the	1940s.	
	
Finally,	what	can	be	said	of	the	applicability	of	any	policy	lessons	from	the	
British	case	in	the	mid-20th	century	to	contemporary	events?	Does	Britain’s	ultimately	
futile	battle	to	sustain	sterling’s	exchange	rate	in	the	face	of	market	pressures	support	
the	current	tendency	of	policymakers	to	allow	exchange	rates	to	freely	float	when	they	
are	under	speculative	attack?	Or	did	Britain’s	efforts	to	delay	devaluation	on	balance	
serve	a	useful	purpose?	The	existence	of	black	market	currencies	and	free	markets,	as	
was	the	case	during	the	mid-20th	century,	shows	how	difficult	a	task	it	can	be	for	
policymakers	to	manage	an	artificially	high	or	low	exchange	rate	in	the	medium-	to	
long-run.	
	
The	financial	repression	practiced	by	Britain	in	the	mid-20th	century	appears	to	
have	yielded	mixed	results.	On	the	one	hand,	Britain	appears	to	have	been	capable	of	
generating	substantial	financial	repression	savings	relative	to	GDP.	At	the	same	time	
capital	leakages	and	the	steady	rise	seen	in	government	bond	yields	over	time	suggest	
that	Britain	was	unable	or	unwilling	to	engage	in	the	total	financial	repression	that	may	
have	been	necessary	to	avoid	devaluing	sterling	and	default.	After	the	Second	World	
War	Britain	was	also	something	of	an	exception	in	terms	of	its	track	record	of	financial	
stability	amongst	advanced	countries.	One	of	the	claimed	benefits	of	financial	
repression	policies	(sometimes	also	presented	as	macroprudential	policies)	is	financial	
stability.	However,	Britain’s	string	of	significant	and	lesser	financial	crises	from	the	
1940s-70s	would	seem	to	suggest	that	Britain	did	not	fully	realize	this	benefit.	This	fact	
raises	questions	over	the	effectiveness	of	financial	repression	at	increasing	financial	
stability,	or	it	could	also	speak	to	the	lesser	degree	of	British	financial	repression	
during	this	period.	More	comparative	analysis	between	Britain	and	other	advanced	
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countries	on	the	degree	of	financial	repression	practiced	by	each	would	be	useful	for	
understanding	what	impact	financial	repression	may	have	had	on	both	financial	
stability	and	economic	growth	in	advanced	economies	during	this	period.		
	
With	regards	to	any	policy	lessons	from	Britain’s	post-Second	World	War	battle	
for	debt	sustainability,	the	peculiar	features	of	Britain’s	circumstances	and	position	
during	this	time	must	be	acknowledged.	First,	the	context	surrounding	the	traumatic	
events	of	the	Second	World	War,	and	particularly	the	esprit	de	corps	with	which	
agreements	such	as	Bretton	Woods	were	negotiated	and	drafted,	was	historically	
unusual.	Second,	following	the	war	Britain	benefitted	tremendously	from	a	partnership	
with	a	now	hegemonic	United	States,	which	then	represented	approximately	50%	of	
the	world’s	total	gross	domestic	product.	Britain’s	relationship	with	the	world’s	
dominant	economic	superpower	opened	the	door	to	significant	financial	aid	in	the	
form	of	the	Anglo-American	loan,	debt	forgiveness,	Marshall	Plan	funds,	and	a	myriad	
of	other	support	that	may	have	been	unique	to	having	such	a	dominant	hegemon	as	an	
international	partner.	Further,	while	sterling’s	importance	was	diminished	following	
the	Second	World	War,	Britain	was	still	in	possession	of	one	of	the	two	global	reserve	
currencies,	and	London	was	(and	remains)	a	key	global	hub	for	financial	capital.	While	
these	and	other	aspects	may	make	the	British	case	unique,	one	finding	from	this	
research	is	the	very	significant	role	that	financial	aid	and	support	from	other	nations	
can	play	in	sovereign	debt	sustainability,	particularly	vis-à-vis	geopolitical	
considerations.	
	
In	closing,	this	thesis	has	sought	to	contribute	toward	our	understanding	of	
sovereign	debt,	financial	repression	and	monetary	innovation	by	examining	the	case	of	
Britain	during	the	mid-20th	century.	In	the	wake	of	the	2008	financial	crisis,	many	
questions	have	arisen	over	the	direction	of	macroeconomics	as	a	discipline.	History,	
which	prior	to	2008	had	seen	a	steady	decrease	in	emphasis	in	economic	academic	
programs,	provides	a	useful	empirical	perspective	on	bedevilling	questions	such	as	
“how	much	public	debt	is	too	much”.	While	caution	must	always	be	exercised	when	
comparing	history	with	the	present,	I	hope	this	work	of	economic	history	makes	a	
contribution	toward	our	understanding	of	contemporary	economic	and	social	
challenges.	
